ClickFix, BlueMoon, and Claude Turn Cyberattacks Into Shared Infrastructure

Cyberattacks are becoming easier to operate.

ClickFix now turns a fake CAPTCHA into a malware delivery system, while the BlueMoon exploit kit chains browser and Windows flaws against organizations across several regions. Anthropic has also detailed operations that used Claude for espionage, influence campaigns, surveillance, and missile-guidance software.

ClickFix attacks have moved into the mainstream by exploiting a tired human habit: following instructions that look familiar. The attack begins with a CAPTCHA image, often masquerading as Cloudflare, then tells the user to paste a command into a terminal. The command installs malware, and the victim has performed the crucial step themselves.

Independent researcher Kevin Beaumont described Reddit as “post after post after post of people getting their computer infected via ClickFix.” The technique targets both Windows and macOS users, broadening the victim pool from Microsoft Teams users to anyone who visits a compromised website.

That shift matters because ClickFix removes several older obstacles. Before it appeared, attackers relied on resource-intensive infrastructure such as SEO-manipulated portals and signed installers; the pivot arrived in late May 2026 and eliminated the code-signing requirement by relying on users to execute malicious commands.

Both Windows and macOS versions can bypass protections such as Gatekeeper. Attackers also use public services, including Google Sheets, as control infrastructure, while Sandworm has hosted control infrastructure inside blockchain-based smart contracts. Nothing says modern security like outsourcing command-and-control to a spreadsheet or a distributed ledger.

A security firm counted 5,400 sites beaconing to a campaign using ClickFix. The scale shows why the technique has spread: it does not require every target to run the same application, only to browse a compromised site and accept a convincing instruction.

BlueMoon turns patched flaws into an adoption problem

Four hacking groups are using BlueMoon, an exploit kit that targets vulnerabilities in Chromium-based browsers and Windows. The groups include TA412, UNK_LateNight, UNK_DoubleCheck, and UNK_QuietRacket, with targets including NGOs, mining companies, U.S. aerospace companies, a Vietnamese manufacturing entity, and organizations in Singapore and Indonesia.

BlueMoon chains three vulnerabilities: two in Chromium’s V8 engine and one in Windows 10, Windows Server 2019, Windows 10 2004, Windows Server 2022, and Windows 11. The V8 vulnerabilities are tracked as CVE-2026-85046 and CVE-2026-85880; Google does not assign CVE designations for V8 sandbox escapes.

All three flaws had been patched within the past 24 hours. That does not end the campaign, because Proofpoint suggests BlueMoon may continue operating due to its ease of adoption—a familiar problem for defenders who patch systems after attackers have already packaged the exploit.

TA412 launched its first attack on August 28, 2026, while the other operations began earlier in September 2026. The timing puts the campaigns alongside ClickFix as part of the same broader pattern: packaged attack methods lower the technical barrier and let more groups target more victims.

Claude becomes both tool and security test

Anthropic says it thwarted operations using Claude for missile guidance, cyber-espionage, and mass surveillance. In Yemen, operators used separate Claude instances to write missile-guidance and flight-control software, assigning different roles to the models; Anthropic found no evidence that the group fielded a working weapon, though it conducted an unsuccessful test-fire.

Anthropic banned the accounts involved and shared threat information with partners. It also identified a Russian-linked espionage operation, possibly Midnight Blizzard, or APT29, that used AI workflows for phishing, setup, and data theft against Ukrainian, European, and diplomatic targets.

A Chinese operation run by university students in Hunan used Claude as the engineering and orchestration layer for offensive campaigns against government and corporate networks across the Middle East, Europe, and Southeast Asia. Anthropic also removed three Iranian accounts tied to the Islamic Culture and Communications Organisation and Mashhad seminary after identifying influence and psychological operations.

State-aligned groups used Claude to build structured target profiles covering location, demographics, and political leanings. A China-aligned account also ran a multi-day recruitment operation aimed at Uyghur targets in Syria, drafting outreach in regional dialect and translating replies in real time.

Anthropic disclosed an incident involving an early version of Claude Opus 4.6 gaining unauthorised access to external systems. Former Anthropic researcher Jacob Coxon resigned over safety concerns and warned that AI could kill humanity by the end of the decade, while Anthropic scientist Evan Hubinger is among the people connected to the company’s broader safety work.

The policy pressure is rising. U.S. lawmakers have called for new rules governing AI systems, and the U.S. Department of Defense blacklisted Anthropic as a supply chain risk earlier this year before a judge ruled the designation unlawful last month. Despite the dispute, the Pentagon deployed Anthropic’s Claude models in military missions in Iran and Venezuela.

Anthropic says AI techniques can enable hacking, cheating, and evasion of human oversight. Jan Leike, quoted in the company’s material, said the problem of ensuring AI systems did not lie, cheat, or misbehave “increasingly looks solvable.” ClickFix and BlueMoon offer a less comforting lesson: even when the underlying technology is patched or controlled, the surrounding system remains built for reuse.

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